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Using the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses, the authors investigate the 
impact of labor and marriage market conditions on the incidence of 
marriage of young women (age 16-24). They first estimate the effects on 
marriage of personal characteristics and Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) indicators, separately by race and education group. They then 
regress the first-stage MSA effects on MSA-level labor and marriage 
market conditions and welfare benefits, taking account of fixed effects 
and time trends specific to each MSA. Better female labor markets, 
worse female marriage markets, and worse male labor markets are found 
to lower marriage rates for whites in all education groups. Results for these 
variables for blacks are sensitive to estimation technique, although stronger 
results are obtained for an older age group (25-34). While welfare benefits 
have a negative effect in cross-sectional analyses, the association becomes 
considerably weaker in fixed effects specifications. 
T he decline in marriage rates in the 
United States in the last 30 years has 
been part of a remarkable set of social 
changes affecting ender roles in the post- 
World War II era. For example, the frac- 
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was once typical behavior for young women 
has now become the exception. At the 
same time that marriage has been on the 
decline, women's education levels and la- 
bor force attachment have been increasing 
steadily.' And the incidence of female- 
headed families among all families rose 
from 10.7% in 1970 to 17.6% in 1995 (Blau, 
Ferber, and Winkler 1998:292). While it 
may be hard to determine causality among 
such trends, there is no doubt that, on 
average, women were both better prepared 
to support themselves economically and 
more likely to have to do so by the 1990s 
than they had been in the 1960s. 
The juxtaposition of these trends in 
marriage, family structure, education, 
and labor force participation illustrates 
the two faces of the decline in marriage. 
On the one hand, the decline in mar- 
riage, particularly for young people, is 
strongly associated with women's longer 
periods of schooling and increased labor 
force attachment. The educational and 
career opportunities that have become 
available since the 1960s have led many 
women to delay marriage and childbear- 
ing. If the entire decline in marriage for 
young people were simply an outcome of 
this delay, most would not view the phe- 
nomenon as a social problem. 
However, falling marriage rates also have 
a downside, one that is of increasing con- 
cern for public policy-the rising incidence 
of children growing up in single-parent 
homes, often falling below the poverty line. 
While overall teen birth rates have actually 
declined since 1970, the share of those 
births that are out-of-wedlock has risen dra- 
matically (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998). 
The importance of trends in marriage rates 
for this development is underscored by the 
'For example, labor force participation rates of 
married women in the United States rose from 35.4% 
in 1966 to 60.6% in 1994, while the fraction of new 
female high school graduates who enrolled in college 
increased from 48.5% in 1970 to 65.4% in 1994 (Blau, 
Ferber, and Winkler 1998:95; Ehrenberg and Smith 
1997:297). 
fact that the rising incidence of children 
among young, single women is explained 
(in an accounting sense) primarily by the 
rising pool of single women in the "at risk" 
group rather than by an increase in child- 
bearing among single women (Blank 1995). 
This second face of the decline in marriage 
implies that a large number of women and 
children will live in poverty-an outcome 
that is especially likely for nonwhite and 
less-educated women. 
In this paper, we seek to better under- 
stand the underlying determinants of mar- 
riage rates among young women. Given 
particular concern about the effects of the 
deteriorating labor market for less skilled 
workers on the marriage rates of less-edu- 
cated women, we focus especially on the 
impact of labor market conditions for both 
young men and young women, as well as 
"marriage market" conditions, macroeco- 
nomic factors, and welfare policy.2 We use 
Census data on individuals primarily from 
the 1980 and 1990 files, with additional 
data from 1970 in some of our analyses. 
While previous research on the determi- 
nants of marriage has examined some of 
the same issues we do, our approach disen- 
tangles labor market and marriage market 
effects in a way that earlier work does not. 
Moreover, in addition to the traditional 
macro-level wage and unemployment mea- 
sures used by other researchers, we employ 
measures of labor market influences that 
capture the underlying demand and supply 
factors affecting the labor market success 
of particular groups. Given likely differ- 
ences by education level in the conse- 
quences of the decline in marriage for 
young women, as well as possible differ- 
ences across education categories in the 
relative importance of various causes, we 
disaggregate all of our analyses by educa- 
tion group. 
2For evidence on the deterioration in the labor 
market for less-skilled young men and women, see, 
for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Burtless 
(1994). 
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Prior Research on the 
Determinants of Marriage 
and Contributions of This Study 
A basic framework linking labor market 
conditions and marriage decisions (Becker 
1981) suggests that greater specialization 
by men in market work and women in non- 
market work raises the gains to marriage. 
Thus, all else equal, better labor market 
opportunities for men are expected to in- 
crease the incidence of marriage, while 
better labor market opportunities for 
women are expected to lower it. An addi- 
tional prediction from Becker's analysis is 
that, controlling for men's and women's 
labor market opportunities, a larger rela- 
tive supply of potential partners for women 
will raise their likelihood of marriage (see 
also Grossbard-Shechtman 1993). The im- 
portance of the supply of "marriageable" 
men has been emphasized by Wilson (1987), 
Ellwood and Crane (1990), and Darity and 
Myers (1995). 
Consistent with Becker's analysis, sev- 
eral studies have found that men's employ- 
ment opportunities have a positive effect 
on marriage for both blacks and whites, 
although their quantitative effect may be 
small.3 Studies focusing on women's labor 
market prospects have tended to find that 
better employment opportunities are asso- 
ciated with declines in marriage for white 
women, but not for blacks (White 1981; 
Mare and Winship 1991; Schultz 1994; 
McLanahan and Casper 1995; Wood 1995). 
One problem with previous work is that it 
has tended to focus simply on the wages of 
women and their potential partners, with- 
out regard to marriage market availability. 
When marriage market availability has been 
considered, the focus has been on the sup- 
ply of marriageable men only, not taking 
into account that the supply of women may 
also vary. Moreover, men's labor market 
3See, for example, Mare and Winship (1991); 
Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, and Landry (1992); 
South and Lloyd (1992); Schultz (1994); McLanahan 
and Casper (1 995); Ellwood and Crane (1 990); Wood 
(1995). 
success and marriage market availability 
are generally combined into one variable, 
for example, the supply of single men who 
are employed or earn more than a particu- 
lar amount. In our work, we extend these 
analyses by more carefully distinguishing 
labor market success from marriage market 
availability. 
This study also differs from previous work 
in using a richer set of measures of labor 
market conditions, some of which are dis- 
aggregated by education and race groups. 
Disaggregating by education and race is 
particularly important given the increase 
in labor market inequality that has occurred 
over the past few decades. In addition, 
rather than use actual earnings and em- 
ployment of women and their potential 
partners as explanatory variables, we use 
estimates of the underlying supply and de- 
mand conditions that determine these wage 
and employment opportunities. Our ap- 
proach is less likely to be contaminated by 
reverse causality biases than much of the 
previous literature.4 Moreover, studies us- 
ing area levels of family formation out- 
comes tend to use average marriage rates as 
the dependent variable, raising the possi- 
bility that observed correlations between 
marriage rates and the explanatory vari- 
ables reflect compositional factors, for ex- 
ample, a highly educated population. We 
account in a very detailed way for composi- 
tion differences across areas. 
Another distinctive feature of our re- 
search design is its focus on young women- 
those aged 16-24. This means that we are 
measuring labor market conditions at 
roughly the time when these women are 
making their family formation decisions. 
Including older age groups, as many previ- 
ous studies have done, brings in people 
4Schultz (1994) used a woman's predicted wage 
and the predicted wage of her potential male partner 
as explanatory variables in a marriage equation. While 
this approach does not suffer from the kind of reverse 
causality bias discussed above, it does not include a 
measure of the likelihood of employment or the 
overall availability of partners. 
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who made their family formation decisions 
at widely varying times, hence possibly un- 
der widely differing labor market condi- 
tions. However, our focus on a young age 
group may have its own drawbacks, particu- 
larly in the interpretation of results for 
highly educated women. Given the low 
marriage rates of young college-educated 
women, one may reasonably wonder 
whether the relevant decision "window" for 
them, that is, the age range during which 
they are most actively considering marriage, 
is indeed higher than 16-24. In addition, 
young women currently enrolled in college 
may have moved in order to attend school 
and thus may not be strongly influenced by 
the labor and marriage market conditions 
in the MSA where they currently reside. To 
test the robustness of our findings, we per- 
form a supplementary analysis of women 
aged 25-34; such results should be of inter- 
est for all education groups but most espe- 
cially for college-educated women. 
In analyzing the impact of labor and 
marriage market conditions on marriage 
decisions, we follow a methodology similar 
to that of recent labor market studies that 
have exploited cross-sectional variation 
among labor markets in changes in wages, 
wage inequality, and employment over the 
1970s and 1980s to test hypotheses about 
their causes (for example, Freeman 1991; 
Bound and Holzer 1993, 2000). As dis- 
cussed in greater detail below, cross-sec- 
tional estimates of these effects may be 
biased if MSA-level variables are correlated 
with unobserved MSA fixed effects or an 
unobserved MSA-level time trend. For this 
reason, we estimate first- and second-differ- 
ence specifications that can eliminate these 
effects. Our second-difference estimates 
constitute a particularly distinctive feature 
of this study. Another methodological is- 
sue that has been identified in these types 
of studies is that migration between metro- 
politan areas can complicate the interpre- 
tation of results based on these units of 
analysis (Bound and Holzer 2000). In the 
work described below, we also consider this 
issue. 
There is also a considerable literature 
investigating the impact of welfare on 
women's family formation decisions. In a 
recent review, Moffitt (1998) concluded 
that, more often than not, welfare benefits 
are found to have a negative effect on mar- 
riage, although frequently these effects are 
small, many studies find no statistically sig- 
nificant effects at all, and others provide 
mixed results. As in the case of the impact 
of labor market conditions, an important 
methodological issue is the possibility of 
biases in cross-sectional estimation caused 
by unobserved MSA-level fixed effects and 
time trends (for example, Ellwood and Bane 
1985; Hoynes 1997). Hoynes's (1997) study 
of single headship is one of the few to take 
account of the latter by including indi- 
vidual as well as state fixed effects. How- 
ever, the inclusion of individual fixed ef- 
fects means that the impact of welfare is 
identified from migrants only. An advan- 
tage of our use of a second difference speci- 
fication, as an alternative method of ad- 
dressing this problem, is that it does not 
place the entire burden of identification 
on migrants. An additional advantage of 
our study is that our improved controls for 
labor market conditions provide a sharper 
test of the impact of welfare on marriage 
decisions. 
Analytical Framework, 
Data, and Methodology 
This study exploits differences across 
metropolitan areas in labor and marriage 
market conditions and welfare policy to 
estimate the impact of these factors on the 
incidence of marriage for young women. 
The analytical framework is based on the 
assumption that substitution in the labor 
market between groups such as high school 
dropouts or college graduates is imperfect. 
Thus, changes in relative supply or demand 
for such groups will, in general, produce 
changes in relative wage offers (Katz and 
Murphy 1992), which will in turn affect 
family formation decisions in the ways dis- 
cussed above. 
We exploit variation across local labor 
markets in supply and demand to test this 
framework. Our maintained hypothesis is 
that supply and demand adjustments across 
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regions are partially limited by mobility 
costs. These costs imply that the nature of 
local labor markets lies between two ex- 
tremes. At one extreme, if mobility were 
costless, all inter-area wage differences (not 
compensated for by amenities or cost of 
living differences) would be quickly 
arbitraged by migration. At the other ex- 
treme, if mobility costs were infinite, each 
local labor market could be treated as an 
island. The full effects of local labor mar- 
ket demand and supply shifts would be 
reflected in area wages and employment- 
to-population ratios. If, as is likely, local 
labor markets lie between these two ex- 
tremes,5we may reach some qualitative con- 
clusions about the relationship between 
findings based on inter-area differences in 
supply or demand shifts and the ultimate 
goal of explaining young women's mar- 
riage outcomes in the United States in gen- 
eral. However, due to migration, the ef- 
fects of inter-area demand and supply 
changes on family formation decisions are 
expected to be smaller than the effects of 
similar shifts in the nation as a whole. Mi- 
gration will also change the composition of 
an area's population, if those moving to a 
new location differ in some characteristics 
from those already there. Thus, we briefly 
examine the implications of migration for 
our conclusions. 
We primarily use microdata on women 
age 16-24 from the 5% samples of the 1980 
and 1990 Censuses, additionally using the 
2% sample of the 1970 Census in some 
supplementary analyses. These are the larg- 
est available samples in each year and con- 
tain sufficient observations to stratify analy- 
ses by race-education group and to identify 
local labor market effects within each of 
these categories. Since it is possible that 
the effects of area differences in the impact 
of labor market conditions on marriage are 
sensitive to overall economic conditions, it 
5For a fuller consideration of these issues, see 
Topel (1986); Bound and Holzer (1993, 2000); and 
Bartik (1993). 
is fortunate that macroeconomic conditions 
were similar in 1980 and 1990. We distin- 
guish two race groups: non-Hispanic whites 
and non-Hispanic blacks.6 We also divide 
our samples of young women into three 
education groups based on years of school- 
ing completed: those with less than a high 
school education (ED < 12); those who 
have completed high school but have no 
further education (ED = 12); and those 
who have completed some education be- 
yond high school, including both those 
with some college and those with a college 
degree or more (ED > 12). 
Our local labor markets are "metropoli- 
tan statistical areas" (MSAs). Where bound- 
aries for MSAs change over time, we use a 
consistent set of definitions so that compa- 
rable areas are defined in 1980 and 1990. 
When MSAs were consolidated in such a 
way that we could not uniquely assign an 
individual to one MSA or be sure that the 
person was in any of our MSAs, we gave that 
individual the weight corresponding to his 
or her probability of inclusion in each MSA. 
Thus, in the computation of means across 
individuals and in regression analyses based 
on individual data, affected individuals may 
be fractionally included in more than one 
MSA, fractionally included in the MSA 
subsample, or both.7 Our sample includes 
6In the 1970 Census, it is not possible to reliably 
identify Hispanic origin, so analyses using 1970 data 
include all blacks and all whites regardless of His- 
panic ethnicity. Even when Hispanics are identified 
separately (in the 1980 and 1990 Census), sample 
sizes in many MSAs are too small to allow us to analyze 
Hispanics separately for a large number of cities. 
7In matching MSAs across the 1980 and 1990 met- 
ropolitan areas as defined by the Census, we were 
guided by Bound and Holzer's (2000) original break- 
down of these areas. We departed from Bound and 
Holzer in our treatment of cases where MSAs were 
consolidated so that it was not possible to uniquely 
allocate an individual to one MSA. As noted in the 
text, rather than arbitrarily allocate all affected indi- 
viduals to one MSA (for example, the one where the 
majority of people in their area reside), we took 
advantage of published information on the propor- 
tion of the population in the individual's "Public Use 
Microdata Area" (PUMA) or County Group residing 
in each MSA to impute the probability that the indi- 
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the 111 MSAs that had more than 20 young 
women in each race-education group. 
While any particular cut-off is arbitrary, 
this should provide sufficient observations 
to compute the levels of the labor market 
variables (described below) for each MSA. 
Although the analysis necessarily excludes 
people who do not live in MSAs, as well as 
those who live in MSAs with insufficient 
sample sizes, our sample nevertheless in- 
cludes the majority of young women: 52- 
64% of whites and 74-81% of blacks.8 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. In 
stage 1, estimated across individuals, we 
estimate MSA effects in linear probability 
models for the incidence of marriage within 
education-race groups in the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses. In stage 2, estimated across MSAs, 
we use the first-stage MSA effects as depen- 
dent variables in the analysis of the impact 
of the labor and marriage market condi- 
tions and welfare variables. 
In the first-stage linear probability mod- 
els, we include as explanatory variables 
dummy variables for age (in individual 
years); years of schooling; whether the 
young woman is an immigrant and how well 
she speaks English (measured as a dummy 
variable for speaking English not well or 
not at all); and individual MSA. For the less 
than high school group, we include con- 
trols for the following educational catego- 
ries: 1-4 years, 5-8 years, 9 years, 10 years, 
and 11 years. For those with exactly twelve 
years completed, no control is needed, and 
for those with some college, we include a 
dummy for completing at least 16 years.9 
vidual resided within a particular MSA. A similar 
approach was used to ensure comparability across the 
1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses when all three were 
used. A more complete explanation is provided in a 
data appendix that is available from the authors upon 
request. 
8A comparison of means indicates that the charac- 
teristics of our sample are very similar to those for the 
entire U.S. population. 
9In calculating years of education, we follow Jae- 
ger (1997) to deal with the changes that were made to 
the education questions beginning in the 1990 Cen- 
sus. 
We include those enrolled as well as those 
not enrolled in school because schooling 
decisions are made in the same context as 
marriage decisions. Thus, in effect, we 
estimate reduced form models for the mar- 
riage decision. Since our samples are young 
and include the enrolled, the within-group 
control for age is important: the meaning 
of having less than a high school education, 
for instance, is not the same for someone 
age 16 (who may be continuing on) as it is 
for someone age 22 (who has likely com- 
pleted her education). Our inclusion of 
individual age dummy variables controls 
for cross-MSA differences in the age com- 
position of the population and thus allows 
for an appropriate interpretation of the 
MSA effects. 
The first-stage models thus have the fol- 
lowing form: 
( 1 ) ~Y., = V. bt + I.C.. w.! + eiz (1) IYiVb+ j 'iwitei, 
where for person i and year t (t = 1980 or 
1990), Y is an indicator variable for mar- 
riage, V is a vector of individual-level vari- 
ables including age dummies (in years), 
schooling dummies (where relevant), and 
immigrant status and language ability, and 
C is a vector of n MSA indicator variables, 
indexed byj.10 Equation (1) was estimated 
separately for each of the six race-educa- 
tion groups for 1980 and 1990, with Huber- 
White corrections for heteroskedasticity.11 
This first-stage analysis produces a set of 
estimated MSA effects for each education- 
race group in 1980 and 1990. In specifying 
the second stage, we begin with the follow- 
ing MSA model for each year t within school- 
ing-race groups: 
(2) wMt = M.G + a. + dt + ct + V. 
I0As noted above, in some cases the MSA indicator 
variable is a fraction, denoting the probability that an 
individual is in MSAj. Since some individuals have a 
positive probability of falling outside the MSA sample, 
we can include n = 111 MSA variables and a constant 
term even though there are 111 included MSAs. 
I"Selected results from these regressions are avail- 
able from the authors upon request. 
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wherej refers to MSA; M is a vector of MSA- 
level variables (described in greater detail 
below), including the adult male unem- 
ployment rate, the log adult male average 
wage level in the labor market, an index of 
labor market net supply (supply relative to 
demand) for women in this race-education 
group, the analogous index of labor mar- 
ket net supply for young men of the same 
race-education group, an index of supply 
of women in the indicated group relative to 
supply of men in the same group, and a 
measure of welfare generosity; G is a vector 
of coefficients; a. is an area fixed effect; d is 
a time effect common to all areas; cj is a time 
trend for areaj; and vj is an error term. The 
variables in M are measured in the same 
year as is marriage. 
Direct estimation of equation (2) could 
result in biased estimates of the coefficients 
on the MSA-level variables if they are corre- 
lated with the unobserved MSA fixed ef- 
fects (a.) or the unobserved MSA time trends 
(cj). For example, community norms may 
be especially tolerant of unmarried adults 
and value a strong safety net of public sup- 
port for those living in poverty, producing 
a spurious negative correlation between 
welfare benefit levels and marriage rates 
due to unobserved MSA fixed effects. Also, 
different MSAs may have different trends 
in these omitted variables (that is, the cj). 
For example, norms in one community may 
become more conservative at a more rapid 
pace than those in another. In the former, 
we might then observe a faster rise in mar- 
riage and fall in real welfare benefit levels, 
but with no causal relationship between the 
two. 
As may be seen in equation (3), first 
differencing of (2) can eliminate the bias 
due to the area-specific fixed effects (a.), 
but it will not eliminate all omitted variable 
biases if there are also area-specific time 
trends (cj) that are correlated with the ex- 
planatory variables:12 
12The changes in the overall time effect (dt- dtl) 
are included in the constant term of equation (3). 
i- 
-1 G M 
t1 
+ (dt - dt 1 + C. + (V. - V.t-1)- 
However, taking the second difference 
of (2) can eliminate biases due to area- 
specific time trends as well as area-specific 
fixed effects:'3 
4) [(w~~ji-j )- (W-t l-Wj't 2)] 
it(M t i- I jt l) - I Mi jt 2)] 
+ [(dt- di,1) - (dtIl - dt-2) 
+[( V.t-V.tl - ( V-t-1- V. t-2)] 
Estimation of equation (4) requires us to 
employ the 1970 Census as well as the 1980 
and 1990 Censuses. Because of the smaller 
sample size of the 1970 Census, for the 
second difference specification we used a 
cut-off of 10 people in each race-education- 
gender group in an MSA, rather than the 
20-person cut-off we employed in the analy- 
ses including 1980 and 1990 only. In addi- 
tion, English language ability was not avail- 
able in the 1970 data and immigration sta- 
tus was not available for the full sample, so 
these variables were omitted from the first- 
stage regressions when 1970 was included. 
Our basic 1980-90 results were unchanged 
when the 1980-90 analyses were repeated 
on the 1980 and 1990 samples created for 
the matched 1970, 1980, and 1990 models. 
Each second-stage levels equation was 
estimated using weighted least squares, with 
the weights being the inverse of the esti- 
mated (heteroskedasticity-robust) variances 
of the first-stage regression coefficients. 
When (2) was estimated in first difference 
form, the weights were 1/ (V80 + V9o), where 
V80 and Vg% are, respectively, the variances 
for the 1980 and 1990 MSA coefficients. 
And when we implemented second differ- 
ences, the weights were 1/ (V70 + 4 V80 + Vg%) . 
13Again, including a constant term in (4) accounts 
for the second difference in the overall time effect. 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) used such a second 
difference methodology to analyze the impact of 
immigration on local labor markets. Of course, bi- 
ases could still remain if there were changes in area- 
specific time trends that differed across areas and 
were correlated with the explanatory variables. 
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The MSA-level variables are constructed 
as follows. First, the net labor market and 
marriage market supply indices are defined 
as 
(5) Net Female Labor Market Supplykjf 
I n (Sk S*) - In (D*) 
(6) Net Male Labor Market SUPP'YkUj. 
= In (Sktjm) - In (Dktjm) 
(7) Net Female Marriage Market Supplyktjf 
=In (Sk, f) - In ( Sk,) 
where k stands for education-race group of 
16-24 year-olds, t for year, j for MSA, f for 
women, and m for men; SktJf and Sktjm are the 
fractions of the total MSA population that 
are in the indicated race-education-gender 
group and aged 16-24; and Dktjf and Dktjm are 
demand indexes for women and men in the 
indicated race-education-gender group and 
aged 16-24. The demand indexes are simi- 
lar to those constructed by Katz and Murphy 
(1992) and are defined (using female de- 
mand as an illustration) as 
(8) Dktjf=I2(sokt *E,tI/Etj) 
where o indexes industry-occupation cat- 
egory (14 industries crossed with 3 occupa- 
tions),14 k indexes race-education group 
(of women in this case), and t stands for 
year; Sokt is the share of total U.S. employ- 
ment in industry-occupation cell o in year t 
represented by group k; and E0tj and E are, 
respectively, total MSA employment in in- 
dustry-occupation cell o and total MSA 
employment. 
'4The industry categories are Agriculture, For- 
estry, and Fisheries; Mining; Construction; Manufac- 
turing (Durable Goods); Manufacturing (Nondurable 
Goods); Transportation, Communications, and Other 
Public Utilities; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Fi- 
nance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Business and Re- 
pair Services; Personal Services Including Private 
Households; Entertainment, and Recreation Services; 
Professional nd Related Services; and Public Admin- 
istration. The three occupation groups are Profes- 
sional, Technical, and Managerial; Clerical and Sales; 
and Craft, Operative, Laborer, and Service. 
The demand index is essentially a pre- 
dicted employment share for group k in 
MSA j, where we weight the relative em- 
ployment of industry-occupation group o 
in area j by the national importance of 
group k in the industry-occupation cell. 
Since the same weights (sok) are used for 
each MSA in a given year, the demand 
index is driven by area differences in over- 
all industry-occupation composition of 
employment. Net labor market supply, 
then, is the relative excess of actual supply 
(in the population) over this predicted rela- 
tive employment. As Katz and Murphy 
(1992) showed in a simple equilibrium 
model, a group's relative wage offers will be 
negatively related to its net labor market 
supply. 
A difficulty in using such variables to 
understand changes in wage rates for vari- 
ous groups over time is that they do not 
capture within-industry-occupation shifts 
in demand. Such shifts, generally attrib- 
uted to technological change, appear to be 
an important component of recent changes 
in relative wages for various skill groups. 
So, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) 
found that relative wages have been in- 
creasing for skilled (that is, college-edu- 
cated) workers despite their rising mea- 
sured net supply; they attributed this to 
within-industry-occupation increases in 
demand for this group that are not cap- 
tured by the demand variable as defined. 
Interestingly, our use of these measures in 
a cross-section context may have more va- 
lidity in that, at a point in time, technology 
is likely to be fairly fixed and measures like 
these, which are driven by MSA differences 
in employment composition, may indeed 
capture much of the true inter-city differ- 
ence in group demand.'5 Similarly, while 
the overall 1980-90 change in the net sup- 
ply measure may not accurately capture the 
true temporal changes for a particular 
group due to unmeasured changes in 
'5Our measure may, of course, miss some hetero- 
geneity across MSAs within our fairly broad industry- 
occupation groupings. 
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within-industry-occupation demand, inter- 
city differences in the magnitude of the 
measured changes, which implicitly net out 
a fixed component due to technological 
change, may be quite informative. 
These demand and supply indexes suffer 
from the well-known problem that they may 
be affected by relative wages and therefore 
are not precisely the same as the desired 
notion of the placement of the local rela- 
tive demand and supply curves (Katz and 
Murphy 1992). But since the demand in- 
dex is based on national shares for the 
group and overall local employment in in- 
dustry-occupation cells, it is not likely to be 
greatly affected by changes in our focal 
groups' local wage levels. And the supply 
index refers to population rather than em- 
ployment shares, again providing a more 
convincing source of exogenous variation, 
although even the population of a given 
race-gender-education group may be af- 
fected by relative wages through migration 
and schooling decisions. These issues of 
exogeneity will be considered further be- 
low.16 
Once we control for the underlying de- 
terminants of labor market prospects (net 
supply) for a given race-education group of 
young women and the corresponding group 
of young men, our further control for "Net 
Female Marriage Market Supply" is also 
expected to influence the marriage deci- 
sions of young women. We measure mar- 
riage market prospects by comparing the 
relative representation of the focal race- 
education group of young women to that of 
the corresponding race-education group 
of young men. We thus implicitly assume 
marital sorting by race and education group, 
an empirically valid assumption (for ex- 
ample, Becker 1981; Tucker and Mitchell- 
Kernan 1990). Note that what has been 
identified in the literature as the supply of 
16The demand index as defined above uses em- 
ployment shares and current year national employ- 
ment share weights. Our results were the same when 
we used shares of work hours or 1980 national em- 
ployment share weights for both years. 
"marriageable men" is here incorporated 
into two variables-Net Male Labor Market 
Supply (also defined for the corresponding 
race-education group of young men) and 
Net Female Marriage Market Supply- 
which, taken together, comprise exog- 
enous indicators of this concept. That is, 
they reflect both labor market conditions 
for and relative quantity of the young 
men whom these women would be likely 
to marry. 
The other explanatory variables in equa- 
tion (2) include the log of the sum of the 
maximum AFDC plus food stamp benefits 
available for a family of four in the state in 
which the MSA is located in 1980 dollars; 
the log of the average hourly wage for men 
age 25-54 in the MSA in 1980 dollars; and 
the MSA unemployment rate for men age 
25-54.1' Wages were computed as annual 
earnings last year divided by the product of 
weeks worked and average weekly work 
hours among the non-self-employed. The 
interpretation of welfare benefits is straight- 
forward. Adult male average hourly wages 
and unemployment serve as overall labor 
market indicators. Moreover, controlling 
for wage levels puts a sharper interpreta- 
tion on the welfare variable, since average 
hourly wages are likely to be closely corre- 
lated with local living costs. 
As noted above, the rationale for the 
estimation of fixed effects models, either in 
first or second difference form, is to elimi- 
nate the omitted variables biases caused by 
unobserved MSA effects. While these pro- 
cedures can indeed eliminate these biases 
under some circumstances, it must be ac- 
knowledged that there are also some rea- 
sons to be guarded in evaluating fixed ef- 
fects results, here and elsewhere. 
"7Actual values for the AFDC levels are reduced by 
30% in light of the fact that food stamps were reduced 
by 30% of the AFDC benefit level; see Moffitt (1990). 
In some cases, an MSA spanned more than one state. 
In such cases, the welfare variable was a population- 
weighted average of the benefit levels in each state. 
Those with computed hourly wages less than $1 or 
greater than $250 in 1980 dollars were excluded from 
the calculation of average hourly wages. 
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First, there may be reverse causation such 
that changes in the explanatory variable 
influence changes in the dependent vari- 
able (Besley and Case 1994). For example, 
in states with rapidly declining marriage 
rates and growing welfare caseloads, ben- 
efit levels may be changed in response, 
although the expected direction of such a 
change is uncertain. On the one hand, a 
larger welfare constituency may be able to 
lobby for higher benefit levels. On the 
other hand, greater strains on the state 
treasury may limit increases in welfare ben- 
efit generosity. In either case, we may 
observe a correlation between changes in 
welfare benefits and changes in family for- 
mation decisions that does not reflect a 
true impact of welfare benefits on behav- 
ior. Even a second difference equation 
may not eliminate this bias if the accelera- 
tion of caseloads varies by MSA. Of course, 
a similar objection applies to cross-sectional 
models, and they, moreover, do not re- 
move any truly fixed unobserved MSA ef- 
fects (or trends) that could bias the esti- 
mated coefficients on the observed explana- 
tory variables. 
A second difficulty with fixed effects esti- 
mation, noted by Hamermesh (2000), is 
that the effect of interest is identified solely 
through changes in the key explanatory vari- 
ables within units, in our case MSAs. As 
Hamermesh pointed out, fixed effects meth- 
ods may lose their ability to detect true 
effects if most of the variance in the ex- 
planatory variables is cross-sectional. For 
example, pooling the 1980 and 1990 
samples of MSAs in our data, we find that 
about 94% of the total variance (unweighted 
by MSA size) in the log of real welfare 
benefits is due to variation between MSAs, 
while the other 6% is due to differential 
changes in welfare benefits within MSAs.18 
And, in fixed effects models, our estimates 
of the impact of welfare are based on this 
18Hoynes (1997) also noted that "a permanent 
state component is by far the largest contributor to 
the variance of AFDC benefits." 
6%. A similar pattern characterizes our 
labor market net supply variables: 82-97% 
of the total variance in female and male net 
labor market supply occurs between MSAs. 
Only in the case of the female marriage 
market net supply variable does an appre- 
ciable portion of the total variance occur 
within MSAs (20-56%). Thus, while fixed 
effects models solve some problems, they 
may also reduce the power associated with 
statistical tests. 
This consideration of the econometric 
issues involved in fixed effects estimation 
thus leads us to affirm the uncontroversial 
conclusion that one should put more faith 
in results that hold up under a variety of 
statistical techniques than in results that 
are empirically fragile. 
Results 
Overall Trends 
Table 1 shows mean values for our 
subsample of 111 MSAs in 1980 and 1990.19 
The means are shown separately for the 
entire population (Panel A) and for the 
non-enrolled (Panel B). For the purposes 
of describing overall trends by education 
group, the figures for the non-enrolled 
may be more informative, since years of 
schooling eventually completed will likely 
exceed the current level among the en- 
rolled. Among those who have completed 
less than 12 years of schooling, 60-74% are 
currently enrolled.2" Thus, we focus much 
of our discussion here on the non-enrolled. 
However, for the reasons discussed above, 
in our regression analyses, we use the full 
sample including those enrolled in school. 
"9In addition to the MSA weights (described above), 
for 1990, observations are weighted by the sampling 
weights provided by the Census; no weights are pro- 
vided for other years. 
20f course, even the non-enrolled can return to 
school later. But educational attainment among those 
currently not in school must surely be closer to even- 
tual completed levels than among those currently in 
school. 
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Table 1. Selected Means by Education and Race 
for Women 16-24 Years Old, 11 1 MSA Regression Subsample. 
White (non-Hispanic) Black (non-Hispanic) 
Explanatory Variable ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 
A. ENTIRE POPULATION 
1980 
Married 0.162 0.367 0.247 0.080 0.207 0.178 
Children (1 = yes) 0.150 0.220 0.073 0.253 0.369 0.223 
Enrolled 0.681 0.189 0.487 0.604 0.213 0.506 
Migrated in Last 5 Years 0.099 0.130 0.204 0.063 0.104 0.142 
1990 
Married 0.093 0.264 0.181 0.039 0.112 0.121 
Children (1 = yes) 0.117 0.209 0.081 0.244 0.343 0.211 
Enrolled 0.744 0.277 0.574 0.663 0.312 0.580 
Migrated in Last 5 Years 0.102 0.143 0.202 0.075 0.100 0.162 
B. NON-ENROLLED ONLY 
1980 
Married 0.474 0.435 0.387 0.176 0.245 0.275 
Children (1 = yes) 0.447 0.263 0.122 0.519 0.429 0.336 
Migrated in Last 5 Years 0.144 0.122 0.210 0.076 0.099 0.145 
1990 
Married 0.327 0.346 0.313 0.087 0.144 0.198 
Children (1 = yes) 0.395 0.270 0.142 0.490 0.422 0.322 
Migrated in Last 5 Years 0.135 0.139 0.217 0.071 0.095 0.154 
Note: Individual observations are weighted by the individual's probability of being included in the MSA; 
observations for 1990 are weighted by the Census sampling weights. 
Consider first the patterns of marriage 
and fertility by education level among the 
non-enrolled. The relationship between 
marriage and education differs by race. 
Among whites, marriage was modestly nega- 
tively related to education level in 1980 but 
not strongly related to education in 1990; 
among blacks, there is a positive relation- 
ship between marriage and education level 
in both years. In contrast, the incidence of 
children is strongly negatively related to 
education for both whites and blacks, a 
finding that, together with the marriage 
patterns by education, is consistent with 
the well-known negative relationship be- 
tween single-parenthood and education 
(Blau 1998). 
A final pattern related to education is 
recent migration. Those with some college 
are substantially more likely to have mi- 
grated from another state or country in the 
last five years. This may be due to the fact 
that the labor market for the college-edu- 
cated is geographically wider than that for 
the less educated (Bound and Holzer 2000), 
and it may also reflect a decision to attend 
college in a state different from the one 
where one attended high school. In light of 
the concern raised earlier that migration to 
attend college could dilute the estimated 
effect of MSA labor and marriage market 
conditions for this group, it is interesting to 
note that the vast majority of young women 
with some college (that is, about 80% of 
whites and over 80% of blacks) have not 
moved, at least from a different state, in the 
last five years. 
There are also important racial differ- 
ences in demographic outcomes. Within 
each educational category, black women 
are considerably less likely than white 
women to be married but are more likely to 
have children present. Since, due to their 
lower income levels, black women are more 
likely to be eligible for welfare benefits, 
these differences in marriage rates are con- 
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sistent with an effect of welfare benefits on 
these decisions. Our regression analyses 
presented below will shed light on this is- 
sue. However, we may note here that the 
considerable race differences in marriage 
that exist among more highly educated 
women strongly suggest that welfare is not 
the only explanation. A further racial dif- 
ference in demographic behavior is whites' 
substantially higher migration rates; this 
implies that local labor market conditions 
have a potentially greater effect on black 
outcomes. 
Our descriptive statistics also shed some 
light on changes in young women's behav- 
ior over time. The most striking trend in 
Table 1 is the sharp decline in marriage 
rates for all race-education groups. Focus- 
ing on the non-enrolled, we see that mar- 
riage rates fell 19.2-31.0% (7.4-14.7 per- 
centage points) among whites and 27.8- 
50.9% (7.6-10.1 percentage points) among 
blacks. Further, the absolute and relative 
declines in marriage tend to decrease as 
education level rises. These educational 
patterns could be due to a deteriorating 
labor market for less-skilled men, and we 
will investigate this possibility in more de- 
tail below. Despite the sharp drop in mar- 
riage rates, the incidence of children within 
race-education groups did not change dra- 
matically between 1980 and 1990. This 
trend is consistent with a rise in female- 
headed families. 
Regression Results 
Basic specification. The weighted regres- 
sion results for the second-stage models 
explaining the MSA marriage coefficients 
from a first-stage linear probability model 
are presented in Table 2.21 We consider 
first the findings for the three net supply 
variables. These variables generally have 
21As explained above, the second-stage regressions 
were weighted by the inverse of the estimated vari- 
ance of the first-stage regression coefficient. The 
results were very similar when we did not use weights 
and when we weighted by the MSA population of the 
indicated group. 
the expected effect on marriage for whites 
in all education groups: all else equal, 
better labor markets for women and a less 
favorable gender ratio in the population 
reduce marriage rates, while better male 
labor market prospects raise them.22 Some 
evidence of these effects is also obtained 
for young black women, but the findings 
are sensitive to estimation technique. 
Looking first at whites, we find that, in 
the cross-section, the coefficients on fe- 
male and male labor market net supply are 
substantial in magnitude and are always 
statistically significant. The results for fe- 
male marriage market net supply are some- 
what weaker but are correctly signed in all 
but one case (high school graduates in 
1980, for whom the coefficient is small and 
insignificant) and statistically significant in 
all but one of the remaining cases. These 
cross-sectional findings hold up strongly in 
the first difference specification. Perhaps 
surprisingly in light of the greater likeli- 
hood of geographic mobility among more 
educated women, the impact of these vari- 
ables does not tend to be larger for the less 
educated (who are less mobile), and in- 
deed the largest estimated coefficients are 
for women with some college. Finally, the 
effects of the net supply variables continue 
to be strong and statistically significant in 
each education group when we implement 
the second difference specification. 
Among blacks, the labor and marriage 
market variables are correctly signed in the 
cross-section and usually statistically sig- 
22These three net supply variables are linear com- 
binations of the four underlying supply and demand 
variables for young women and young men of the 
indicated education-race group. Thus, the regres- 
sions in effect restrict the effects of these four vari- 
ables to work through the three created net supply 
measures. We tested these restrictions for each speci- 
fication for each race-education group. There were 
24 regressions in all: 4 time periods (1980, 1990, 
1980-90 first differences, and [ [80-90]-[70-80] ] sec- 
ond differences) x 3 education groups x 2 race groups. 
Based on F-tests, the restrictions on the four supply 
and demand variables were accepted at the 5% sig- 
nificance level in 14 out of 24 cases; the cases where 
the restrictions failed did not show a strong pattern. 
636 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
Table 2. Weighted Regression Results for Marriage Incidence: Women 16-24 Years Old. 
Education Group 
ED< 12 ED =12 ED > 12 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
A. White (non-Hispanic) 
1980 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.218 0.044 0.295 0.047 0.326 0.076 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.102 0.069 0.018 0.083 -0.310 0.083 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.223 0.047 -0.266 0.051 -0.378 0.068 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.123 0.012 -0.176 0.024 -0.116 0.023 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.008 0.028 -0.026 0.053 -0.089 0.053 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.058 0.137 -0.239 0.279 -0.049 0.243 
1990 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.213 0.047 0.205 0.072 0.325 0.106 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.209 0.058 -0.192 0.091 -0.258 0.113 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.206 0.048 -0.208 0.075 -0.376 0.100 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.097 0.015 -0.214 0.036 -0.101 0.030 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.037 0.025 -0.203 0.066 -0.232 0.053 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.341 0.162 -0.300 0.410 -0.404 0.354 
First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.126 0.065 0.204 0.075 0.294 0.099 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.173 0.065 -0.231 0.073 -0.298 0.097 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.145 0.058 -0.138 0.068 -0.292 0.091 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.070 0.033 0.032 0.054 -0.044 0.048 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.129 0.031 -0.101 0.057 0.025 0.047 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.172 0.174 0.258 0.279 0.033 0.275 
Second Differences ((90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.248 0.122 0.263 0.125 0.546 0.186 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.213 0.119 -0.335 0.152 -0.537 0.199 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.203 0.120 -0.311 0.138 -0.609 0.189 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.023 0.031 -0.033 0.047 -0.022 0.045 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.144 0.046 0.150 0.081 0.073 0.060 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.110 0.181 0.619 0.299 0.407 0.325 
Continued 
nificant for all education groups in 1980 
and larger than their standard errors for 
those with less than a high school degree 
(ED < 12) in 1990.23 However, these vari- 
ables perform poorly in 1990 for the other 
two education groups. When area fixed 
effects are removed for blacks (that is, in 
the first difference specification), the coef- 
ficients on the three labor and marriage 
market variables become small and insig- 
23Taken as a group, the three labor and marriage 
market variables were statistically significant for blacks 
with ED < 12 in 1990 at better than the 2% level. 
nificant for the ED < 12 group, but substan- 
tial and statistically significant effects are 
obtained for high school graduates, and 
the estimated coefficients are correctly 
signed for blacks with some college. Fi- 
nally, in the second difference specifica- 
tion for blacks, the labor and marriage 
market variables are never statistically sig- 
nificant but are correctly signed for those 
with at least a high school degree. 
Turning to the effect of welfare benefits 
on marriage, the results are sensitive to 
specification. We see for 1980 strong, sta- 
tistically significant negative coefficients for 
each race-education group. And these sig- 
nificant effects are also observed in 1990 
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Table 2. Continued. 
Education Group 
ED< 12 ED =12 ED > 12 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
B. Black (non-Hispanic) 
1980 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.079 0.039 0.152 0.058 0.122 0.075 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.120 0.044 -0.180 0.065 -0.083 0.080 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.084 0.038 -0.141 0.054 -0.137 0.070 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.070 0.017 -0.086 0.037 -0.119 0.037 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.008 0.029 -0.028 0.058 0.082 0.058 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.250 0.161 -0.700 0.339 -0.714 0.345 
1990 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.071 0.049 0.031 0.093 -0.040 0.106 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.078 0.050 -0.016 0.095 0.037 0.108 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.081 0.048 -0.024 0.091 0.025 0.102 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.028 0.017 0.041 0.043 -0.046 0.040 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.001 0.023 -0.189 0.060 -0.105 0.058 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) 0.158 0.141 -0.498 0.375 -0.126 0.370 
First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.007 0.079 0.255 0.118 0.087 0.154 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.023 0.080 -0.274 0.113 -0.090 0.151 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.002 0.076 -0.259 0.109 -0.066 0.150 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.095 0.049 -0.039 0.089 -0.030 0.094 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.096 0.047 0.161 0.088 0.163 0.091 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.323 0.242 -0.536 0.413 -1.038 0.430 
Second Differences (90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) -0.087 0.117 0.095 0.205 0.168 0.275 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) 0.036 0.114 -0.152 0.210 -0.122 0.278 
Male Net Supply (labor market) 0.068 0.109 -0.162 0.207 -0.100 0.281 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.016 0.046 -0.074 0.082 -0.004 0.089 
LogAverage Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.175 0.067 0.299 0.122 0.382 0.116 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.123 0.294 -0.613 0.511 -0.533 0.475 
Note: Regressions include a constant term. 1980 and 1990 cross-sections and 90-80 first differences are based 
on the matched 111 MSA 80-90 sample; second differences are based on the matched 67 MSA 70-80-90 sample. 
for whites. However, in each of these cases 
(that is, 1980 black and white cross-sections 
and 1990 white cross-sections), the abso- 
lute value of the estimated effect is at least 
as large for more highly educated groups as 
for those with less than a high school de- 
gree, the group for whom we expect the 
largest negative welfare effect. While this 
pattern does not suggest a welfare impact 
on marriage, the first difference results do 
point in this direction: they are statistically 
significant, or nearly so, only in the case of 
the less educated, and the largest negative 
effects are for this group as well. But this 
pattern disappears when we perform sec- 
ond differences: none of the welfare coef- 
ficients are significant and the less edu- 
cated no longer have the largest estimated 
negative effects. Only in the perhaps im- 
plausible instance in which omitted area- 
specific factors affecting marriage and wel- 
fare benefits are truly fixed can we con- 
clude that welfare benefits affect marriage 
rates.24 
Finally, we consider results for the macro- 
level indicators of adult male average wages 
24We estimated supplementary models with a 
dummy variable for AFDC-UP coverage and obtained 
similar results. 
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Table 3. Weighted Regression Results for Marriage Incidence: Women 25-34 Years Old. 
Education Group 
ED< 12 ED =12 ED > 12 
Explanatory Variable Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
A. White (non-Hispanic) 
1980 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.120 0.039 0.190 0.031 0.349 0.075 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.058 0.054 -0.015 0.050 -0.273 0.074 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.081 0.041 -0.119 0.034 -0.349 0.077 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.174 0.021 -0.128 0.016 -0.127 0.024 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.064 0.045 -0.003 0.034 -0.153 0.049 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.054 0.228 0.261 0.175 1.250 0.274 
1990 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.188 0.066 0.122 0.039 0.264 0.058 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.187 0.073 -0.005 0.055 -0.141 0.076 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.172 0.071 -0.089 0.042 -0.271 0.059 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.240 0.033 -0.127 0.023 -0.116 0.023 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.094 0.058 -0.020 0.039 -0.094 0.039 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) 0.066 0.382 -0.254 0.251 -0.054 0.277 
First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) -0.146 0.088 0.022 0.054 0.146 0.074 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) 0.108 0.093 -0.028 0.050 -0.197 0.072 
Male Net Supply (labor market) 0.179 0.090 -0.047 0.052 -0.164 0.073 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.004 0.082 -0.074 0.043 0.006 0.034 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.010 0.088 0.060 0.044 -0.001 0.036 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.328 0.430 0.106 0.216 0.262 0.192 
Second Differences ((90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.238 0.171 0.237 0.089 0.212 0.134 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.266 0.198 -0.205 0.094 -0.402 0.132 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.154 0.196 -0.210 0.096 -0.422 0.143 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.081 0.068 -0.045 0.041 -0.031 0.044 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.032 0.130 0.036 0.062 0.125 0.062 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) 0.209 0.526 0.342 0.237 0.259 0.275 
Continued 
and unemployment rates. Unlike the group- 
specific labor and marriage market vari- 
ables, the aggregate indicators appear to 
have more consistent effects for blacks than 
for whites. For example, in our four speci- 
fications in Table 2, Part B, adult male 
unemployment rates are negatively associ- 
ated with black marriage rates 11 of 12 
times, with a significant coefficient 3 of 
these 11 times. In the first and second 
difference specifications, adult male un- 
employment has a negative effect in each 
case and is statistically significant once. In 
the cross-sections, the coefficient on aver- 
age adult male wages is inconsistently signed 
for blacks. However, in the first and second 
difference specifications, average adult 
male wages have positive effects on black 
marriage rates, which are statistically sig- 
nificant or nearly so in every case. In con- 
trast to the unemployment results for blacks, 
the impact of this variable is somewhat 
unstable for whites. The unemployment 
rate is found to have a negative effect on 
marriage for all education groups in the 
cross-section, though these coefficients are 
generally insignificant; however, in the first 
and second difference specifications, the 
estimated effects are negative for less edu- 
cated women, but positive for the other 
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Table 3. Continued. 
Education Group 
ED < 12 ED =12 ED > 12 
Explanatoyy Variable Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
B. Black (non-Hispanic) 
1980 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.156 0.070 0.120 0.056 0.198 0.093 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.209 0.073 -0.188 0.066 -0.252 0.106 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.156 0.067 -0.100 0.052 -0.171 0.088 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.137 0.036 -0.084 0.039 -0.113 0.046 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.111 0.061 -0.154 0.062 -0.173 0.081 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.332 0.316 -0.603 0.349 -0.499 0.438 
1990 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.236 0.109 0.217 0.087 0.181 0.108 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.307 0.114 -0.337 0.096 -0.192 0.118 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.236 0.108 -0.195 0.086 -0.163 0.103 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.046 0.051 -0.036 0.048 -0.066 0.051 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.146 0.072 -0.189 0.065 -0.161 0.073 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -1.149 0.436 -0.880 0.408 -0.998 0.442 
First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.223 0.141 0.103 0.112 0.257 0.164 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.251 0.136 -0.110 0.109 -0.355 0.159 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.204 0.131 -0.086 0.107 -0.237 0.157 
Log Welfare Benefits 0.029 0.101 -0.033 0.096 -0.145 0.092 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.089 0.097 -0.006 0.093 0.172 0.094 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.957 0.506 -0.626 0.456 -0.089 0.437 
Second Differences ((90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.474 0.232 0.359 0.189 0.570 0.274 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.556 0.236 -0.443 0.186 -0.675 0.272 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.553 0.255 -0.327 0.189 -0.553 0.264 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.178 0.122 0.057 0.087 0.003 0.096 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.051 0.203 -0.034 0.152 0.115 0.144 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) 1.503 1.001 0.032 0.503 -0.058 0.501 
Note: Regressions include a constant term. 1980 and 1990 cross-sections and 90-80 first differences are based 
on a matched 102 MSA 80-90 sample; second differences are based on a matched 56 MSA 70-80-90 sample. 
education groups. The estimated effect of 
average wages for whites is generally nega- 
tive in the cross-section, but positive 5 of 6 
times in the first and second difference 
specifications, although generally not sta- 
tistically significant in the latter case. 
The effects of these aggregate economic 
indicators for blacks (positive for wages, at 
least in the first and second difference speci- 
fications, and negative for unemployment) 
are consistent with the idea that male mar- 
ket opportunities are more sensitive to ag- 
gregate conditions than are female oppor- 
tunities. To the extent that men are in 
more layoff-prone industries (Blau and 
Kahn 1981), this conclusion makes sense. 
The weaker effects for whites could be due 
to less cyclical sensitivity of white men's 
labor market opportunities relative to 
women's than black men's. 
Resultsfor 25-34-year-olds. As a test of the 
robustness of these findings, Table 3 pre- 
sents results for an older age group of 25- 
34-year-olds.25 For whites, the findings are 
25In order to produce an adequate sample of MSAs, 
we used cut-offs of 15 people in each race-education 
group per MSA for 1980-90 analyses and 10 people 
per group for 1970-80-90 analyses. The resulting 
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quite similar to those obtained for 16-24- 
year-olds, and for blacks they are consider- 
ably stronger. For both blacks and whites, 
the labor and marriage market variables 
have the correct sign in all but one case 
(that is, the first difference specification 
for white women with less than 12 years of 
education) and are frequently statistically 
significant. In particular, for women of 
both races, the results are strong for the 
target group for this supplemental analy- 
sis: women with some college education. 
For this group, the labor and marriage 
market variables are statistically significant 
in all but one case for whites and in 8 of 12 
cases for blacks; the coefficients are larger 
than their standard errors in all the re- 
maining cases. Moreover, the results for 
black women in this age group-are stronger 
than those obtained for younger black 
women in the other educational categories 
as well. Specifically, the market variables 
are not only correctly signed in all specifi- 
cations, they are large relative to their stan- 
dard errors in all but one case. The stron- 
ger and more consistent findings for blacks 
in the older age group suggest that their 
decisions may be more influenced by labor 
and marriage market conditions than are 
those of their younger counterparts. 
As in the case of our findings for younger 
women, the results for the welfare benefits 
variable in the analyses for older women 
are considerably stronger in the cross-sec- 
tion, where it is frequently found to be 
significantly negatively related to marriage, 
than in the difference specifications, where 
it is not generally found to be statistically 
significant. Also, as in the case of the 
previous analysis, the strongest evidence of 
the impact of the adult male unemploy- 
ment rate on marriage is obtained for 
blacks, for whom this variable is negatively 
samples included 102 of the original 111 1980-90 
comparison MSAs and 56 of the original 67 1970-80- 
90 comparison MSAs used in Table 2's analysis of 16- 
24-year-olds. When the models for the 16-24-year- 
olds were restricted to these subsets, the results were 
very similar to those in Table 2. 
signed 10 of 12 times, with a significant 
coefficient in 3 of these cases. 
Assessing the quantitative importance of the 
estimated effects. One issue that arises re- 
garding these findings is their quantitative 
importance for the various subgroups. The 
results in Table 4 for our focal group of 16- 
24-year-olds address this issue. The first 
two rows of the table show the 75-25 gap in 
the MSA marriage coefficients in 1980 and 
in 1990 (that is, the difference between the 
values of the marriage coefficients at the 
75th and 25th percentiles of the MSA distri- 
bution of marriage coefficients). The re- 
mainder of the table shows, for the first and 
second difference specifications, the effect 
on the incidence of marriage of the 75-25 
gap in each explanatory variable (that is, 
the difference between the value of the 
explanatory variable at the 75th percentile 
and the 25th percentile of the MSA distri- 
bution of that variable in 1990).26 
The results in the table indicate that the 
male and female net labor market supply 
variables tend to have the largest effects 
and that these effects are substantial com- 
pared to the overall 75-25 gap in marriage 
coefficients. For example, among less edu- 
cated whites, the 75-25 difference in mar- 
riage coefficients was 2.6 to 4.5 percentage 
points. The second difference specifica- 
tion implies that an increase in the female 
net labor market supply variable between 
the 75th and the 25th percentile of the 
MSA distribution would result in an 11.9 
percentage point rise in the incidence of 
marriage, while a comparable increase in 
male labor market net supply would result 
in a 6.8 percentage point decrease in the 
marriage rate. A note of caution in evaluat- 
ing the contribution of these two variables: 
because they are highly positively corre- 
lated,27 their effects tend to be offsetting. 
2&The 75-25 gaps are computed using population- 
weighted data for each year. 
27For example, among the least educated, the cor- 
relation between male and female net labor market 
supply was .54 for whites and .50 for blacks in the first- 
difference specification. 
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Table 4. Effect of 75-25 Differences in Explanatory Variables on MSA 
Marriage Coefficients, Women 16-24 Years Old, 111 MSA Regression Subsample. 
White (non-Hispanic) Black (non-Hispanic) 
Description ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 
I. 75-25 Gap in 1980 MSA Marriage Coefficient 0.045 0.085 0.071 0.034 0.078 0.071 
II. 75-25 Gap in 1990 MSA Marriage Coefficient 0.026 0.095 0.075 0.016 0.044 0.041 
III. Effects of 75-25 Difference in 1990 MSA-Level Explanatory Variables 
A. First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.061 0.085 0.095 0.008 0.210 0.070 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.007 -0.018 -0.030 -0.002 -0.037 -0.018 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.048 -0.045 -0.086 -0.002 -0.230 -0.042 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.023 0.010 -0.014 -0.030 -0.013 -0.010 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.021 -0.016 0.004 0.015 0.026 0.026 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.013 
B. Second Differences ((90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) 0.119 0.110 0.176 -0.098 0.079 0.137 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.008 -0.025 -0.054 0.003 -0.021 -0.024 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.068 -0.100 -0.180 0.075 -0.144 -0.064 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.024 -0.001 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) 0.023 0.024 0.012 0.028 0.048 0.061 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.001 0.008 0.005 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 
Note: Entries are the indicated regression coefficient times the 75-25 gap across MSAs in the 1990 values for 
the corresponding explanatory variable. 75-25 gaps are computed using population-weighted data for each 
year. 
Though nonetheless often substantial, the 
effect of a 75-25 percentile difference in 
female net marriage market supply is gen- 
erally estimated to be lower than the corre- 
sponding estimates for the male and fe- 
male net labor market supply variables for 
each specification and each group. For 
example, among less educated whites in 
the second difference specification, a 75- 
25 difference in marriage market net sup- 
ply is estimated to reduce the incidence of 
marriage by less than 1 percentage point. 
Interestingly, in this specification, the im- 
pact of this variable tends to increase in 
absolute value by level of education for 
both blacks and whites. 
The effects of the other variables also 
tend to be smaller than the effect for male 
and female net labor market supply. The 
impact of welfare benefits is generally found 
to be small in the second difference speci- 
fication, but some substantial effects are 
obtained for the least educated women in 
the first difference specification, where an 
increase in welfare benefits corresponding 
to the 75-25 gap in this variable is expected 
to decrease white marriage rates by 2.3 
percentage points and black marriage rates 
by 3.0 percentage points. The impact of 
average male wages is larger in the second 
difference specification, especially for 
blacks, for whom an increase in average 
male wages corresponding to the 75-25 
gap would increase marriage rates by 2.8 to 
6.1 percentage points. For blacks, an in- 
crease in the unemployment rate corre- 
sponding to the 75-25 gap is estimated to 
decrease black marriage rates by .7-1.3 
percentage points for women with 12 or 
more years of schooling (that is, ED = 12 
and ED > 12); the impact for whites is small 
and inconsistent in sign. 
Implications for trends in marriage rates. It 
is also of interest to use these results to 
explain the trends in marriage rates over 
time. Although, as discussed above, the 
inability of the underlying demand indexes 
to detect within-industry-occupation shifts 
limits the confidence we can place in such 
an analysis, a review of the estimated contri- 
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Table 5. Decomposition of 1980-1990 Changes in Marriage 
Incidence, Women 16-24 years old, 111 MSA Regression Subsample. 
White (non-Hispanic) Black (non-Hispanic) 
Desciption ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 
II. Unadjusted Change in Marriage Rate -0.076 -0.108 -0.067 -0.044 -0.098 -0.058 
II. Adjusted Change in Marriage Ratea 
A. 1980 Composition Weights -0.053 -0.101 -0.053 -0.038 -0.092 -0.051 
B. 1990 Composition Weights -0.041 -0.100 -0.051 -0.031 -0.088 -0.047 
III. Estimated Effects of 1980-1990 Changes in MSA-Level Explanatory Variables 
A. First Differences (90-80) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) -0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.040 0.005 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) 0.008 0.032 -0.016 0.001 0.052 0.002 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 -0.001 -0.054 -0.005 
Log Welfare Benefits 0.006 -0.003 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.002 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
Total of Net Supply Effects -0.009 0.027 -0.024 0.002 0.038 0.002 
Total Effects of All Variable Changes -0.009 0.029 -0.021 0.005 0.033 -0.006 
B. Second Differences ((90-80)-(80-70)) 
Female Net Supply (labor market) -0.009 0.007 0.012 -0.012 0.015 0.009 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) 0.009 0.046 -0.029 -0.002 0.029 0.003 
Male Net Supply (labor market) -0.017 -0.022 -0.029 0.021 -0.034 -0.007 
Log Welfare Benefits 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.000 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Total of Net Supply Effects -0.017 0.031 -0.047 0.007 0.010 0.005 
Total Effects of All Variable Changes -0.021 0.031 -0.046 0.002 0.003 -0.010 
aControls for changes in the composition of the population based on the estimated first stage regression 
coefficients and the indicated composition weights. 
Note: Entries are the indicated regression coefficient multiplied by the change in the weighted value of the 
corresponding explanatory variable. Weights are the sum of the 1980 and 1990 MSA populations for the 
indicated age-education group of women. 
bution of 1980-90 changes in the means of 
our explanatory variables to the trends in 
marriage rates is nonetheless instructive. 
This decomposition is shown in Table 5. 
We first present the unadjusted change in 
the marriage rate for each group followed 
by two estimates of changes in marriage 
rates adjusted for shifts in the composition 
of the population based on the estimated 
first-stage regression coefficients and 1980 
and 1990 composition weights, respectively. 
A comparison of the unadjusted and ad- 
justed changes in marriage rates for each 
education group shows that changes in the 
composition of the population by age, edu- 
cation (within broader educational catego- 
ries), and immigrant status do not explain 
much of the trend in marriage rates. The 
extent to which the variables included in 
our second-stage analysis can explain the 
remaining trends is examined in Part III of 
the table using the first difference (Panel 
A) and second difference (Panel B) regres- 
sions. 
One reason an examination of these es- 
timates may be of value is suggested by a 
consideration of the changes in the means 
of the labor and marriage market variables 
in our sample shown in Table Al. Based on 
our net supply variable, it appears that the 
male labor market has deteriorated the 
most for less-skilled men, both relative to 
other men and relative to women; these 
changes have been particularly pronounced 
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among blacks.28 Taking into account 
within-industry-occupation demand shifts 
would likely reinforce this conclusion. What 
does our decomposition suggest about the 
impact of these trends? 
Table 5 indicates that the changes over 
time in male net supply contributed to a 
decline in the marriage rate for all race and 
education groups, with the exception of 
blacks with less than 12 years of educa- 
tion.29 The negative effect of this variable 
on marriage rates was particularly large 
among black high school graduates. How- 
ever, with the exception of whites with some 
college education, the total effect of the 
three net supply variables (that is, the sum 
of the effects for female and male net labor 
market supply and female net marriage 
market supply) is estimated to explain only 
a small portion of the decline in the mar- 
riage rate or even to contribute to an in- 
crease. This finding is due to two factors 
that offset the negative effect of adverse 
male labor market trends on marriage. First, 
and quantitatively of considerable impor- 
tance, results for the female marriage mar- 
ket net supply variable indicate that, for all 
but whites with some college education, 
the relative availability of men actually rose, 
increasing particularly sharply for high 
school graduates.30 This marriage market 
availability factor, which reflects rising edu- 
cational attainment among young women, 
contributes to an increase in marriage rates 
for all but white college-educated women. 
Second, Table Al indicates that, by our 
28Blau and Kahn (1997) also found that during the 
1979-88 period labor market supply and demand 
conditions changed least favorably for men relative to 
women among those with low skill levels. 
29This finding for blacks reflects the weak results 
for blacks in the first and second difference specifica- 
tions, rather than trends in means, which, as we have 
seen, were quite adverse for black men in this educa- 
tion category. 
30The weighted changes in female marriage mar- 
ket net supply for blacks (Table Al) are negative for 
all education groups. This is possible to the extent 
that there were movements into and out of the non- 
institutional population of the 111 MSAs on which 
the table is based. 
measure, female net labor market supply 
increased for all but white women with less 
than 12 years of schooling. Thus, Table 5 
shows a positive contribution to marriage 
rates of this variable for the other race- 
education groups, with the exception of 
black women with less than high school 
education in the second difference specifi- 
cation (the latter is due to a perverse result 
on the sign of this variable in the regres- 
sion). This result could very well reflect 
our inability to detect increases in the 
within-industry-occupation demand for 
women workers.3' Had we been able to 
detect such increases, we might have found 
that the labor market for some or all of the 
education groups of women actually im- 
proved over the 1980s, or at least did not 
deteriorate to the extent indicated by our 
measure. 
Turning to results for the other vari- 
ables, we see that changes in welfare ben- 
efits, a popular alternative explanation for 
the rising incidence of single parenthood, 
actually had a modest positive effect on 
marriage trends. This is because welfare 
benefits declined by about 9-10% in real 
terms on average in our sample during the 
1980-90 period. Similarly, since there was 
little change in adult male unemployment 
rates, this factor was not found to have 
played a role in explaining the trends. Adult 
male wages did fall somewhat. While the 
impact of changes in this variable on trends 
was generally not found to be large, for 
black women in the ED = 12 and ED > 12 
groups, the second difference results indi- 
cate that real wage changes could explain a 
1.0-1.2 percentage point decline in mar- 
riage; this corresponds to 11.4-25.5% of 
the adjusted change in marriage rates for 
women in these education groups using 
1990 composition weights. 
3"Increasing relative wages of women over the 
1980s as well as the higher representation of women 
in white-collar and service jobs suggest this may well 
have been the case (see Katz and Murphy 1992; Blau 
and Kahn 1997). 
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While there appear to have been some 
offsetting changes in the impact of the 
explanatory variables, our analysis sug- 
gests that of the factors considered, trends 
in male labor market net supply and adult 
male real wages are those most likely to 
have contributed to the decline in mar- 
riage rates. Another factor that could 
have played a role but that we could not 
measure is an improvement in within- 
industry-occupation demand for female 
labor. 
Possible Endogeneity Biases 
We have found strong evidence, particu- 
larly for whites, that labor and marriage 
markets are related to differences in the 
incidence of marriage in both cross-section 
and fixed effects models. Nonetheless, even 
accounting for MSA fixed effects (first dif- 
ference regressions) and MSA specific time 
trends (second difference regressions), 
there may be endogeneity biases. Deci- 
sions about marriage may influence educa- 
tional attainment or there may be omitted 
variables that cause changes in both family 
formation decisions and educational attain- 
ment. For example, getting married as a 
teenager might lead a young woman to 
drop out of school, thus raising our mea- 
sure of female labor market supply for 
the less educated and correspondingly 
lowering the measured supply of the more 
highly educated.32 Moreover, changes in 
the labor market or welfare variables can 
influence migration. If migration is af- 
fected, then observed changes in the in- 
cidence of marriage may reflect the pre- 
existing behavior of migrants rather than 
changes in the behavior of the current 
population. We now consider these two 
possible sources of bias. 
320ur demand variable could also be affected by 
schooling decisions, but since the demand measure is 
based on total MSA employment shares, it is not likely 
to be greatly influenced by the decisions of young 
people in our age group, who constitute a relatively 
small share of the total MSA population. 
First, on the issue of reverse causality 
going from decisions about marriage to 
decisions about schooling, note that in ev- 
ery case where the female labor and mar- 
riage market variables had statistically sig- 
nificant effects, they had opposite signs. 
For example, consider the results for less 
educated white women. For this education 
group, as for the others, better female la- 
bor markets tended to lower marriage while 
better female marriage markets tended to 
raise it. If reverse causality from marriage 
to educational decisions were the only un- 
derlying behavior our results were measur- 
ing, we would expect the coefficients on 
these two variables to have the same sign. 
The possible bias due to reverse causality 
could help to account for the positive coef- 
ficient on the female labor market net sup- 
ply variable for the less educated: when a 
young woman drops out of school to 
marry, the net supply of the less educated 
and their marriage rate are both in- 
creased. However, the reverse causality 
mechanism also implies an upward bias 
on the female marriage market net sup- 
ply variable for those with lower levels of 
schooling, but we predict and find nega- 
tive effects of this variable on marriage. 
Looking at women with some college 
education leads to predictions about re- 
verse causality bias opposite to our pre- 
dictions for the less educated, since mar- 
riage may lower the supply of college- 
educated women. But where the results 
are statistically significant, we obtain the 
same signs on the labor market and mar- 
riage market variables for college-edu- 
cated women as for those with less educa- 
tion. If reverse causality were the only 
factor driving our results, then we should 
have obtained opposite signs on a given 
supply variable for the high and low edu- 
cation groups. 
Second, to what extent do our results 
reflect alterations in the composition of 
the population due to migration rather 
than true behavioral effects? To examine 
this question, we estimated the impact of 
our explanatory variables on migration 
based on second-stage regression equations 
similar to those employed for marital sta- 
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tUS.33 We found that, for whites, better 
female labor markets, worse female mar- 
riage markets, and worse male labor mar- 
kets in the past are significantly positively 
associated with migration into the area. 
Similar findings are obtained for blacks in 
the cross-sections, but these do not hold up 
in the first difference models, where the 
signs on the net supply variables for blacks 
become unstable and the coefficients are 
usually not statistically insignificant. While 
unemployment, wages, and welfare ben- 
efits sometimes have statistically significant 
migration effects in the cross-sections, they 
do not hold up in the first difference equa- 
tions. Inspection of the means of the vari- 
ables for migrants and nonmigrants sepa- 
rately, within race and education groups, 
indicates that migrants are more likely than 
non-migrants to be married. This pattern 
implies that, whatever the causes of the 
relationships between past labor and mar- 
riage market conditions and migration, 
migrants are not driving the regression re- 
sults in Table 2. If this were the case for 
whites, we would expect better female la- 
bor markets, worse female marriage mar- 
kets, and worse male labor markets to raise 
the incidence of marriage, because each is 
positively associated with migration and, 
within race and education groups, migrants 
are on average more likely to be married. 
33Results available upon request. The dependent 
variable is the MSA coefficient from a 1990 (1980) 
first-stage regression similar to equation (1) for the 
determinants of migration from another state or coun- 
try in the last 5 years. This information is available 
only for a subset of our sample; when migration is 
analyzed, our sample of microdata on individuals is 
reduced by 50%. In the second-stage 1990 and 1980 
cross-sections, we use 1980 (1970) levels of the ex- 
planatory variables, and in the 1980-90 first differ- 
ence analyses, we use 1970-80 changes in the ex- 
planatory variables, so as to assure the causal order- 
ing of the dependent variable. Since we do not have 
data to compute 1960-70 changes in the MSA-level 
explanatory variables, we approximate the second 
difference analysis by re-estimating the first differ- 
ence migration equations and adding the 1965-70 
MSA migration coefficient from the 1970 first-stage 
regression. 
Of course, our findings for these variables 
are precisely the opposite. 
Conclusions 
We have used 1970, 1980, and 1990 Cen- 
sus data to estimate the impact of local 
labor and marriage market conditions and 
welfare benefits on the incidence of mar- 
riage among young women (age 16-24). 
Our most robust findings are for the labor 
and marriage market variables for whites, 
which were found to have a strong impact 
on their marriage incidence in all educa- 
tion groups: better female labor markets, 
worse female marriage markets, and worse 
male labor markets were found to lower 
marriage rates. We also found some evi- 
dence of these effects for young black 
women, but the findings were sensitive to 
estimation technique. Interestingly, when 
the model is estimated for an older age 
group (25-34-year-olds), the results are simi- 
lar for whites, but considerably stronger for 
blacks. 
We additionally found an impact of over- 
all labor market conditions, particularly 
for blacks: higher adult male unemploy- 
ment rates and lower adult male average 
wage rates tended to reduce marriage rates. 
The results for welfare benefits tended to 
be sensitive to specification. In cross-sec- 
tional analyses, there is a negative associa- 
tion between welfare benefits and marriage. 
However, this association becomes weaker 
when we control for fixed effects, a com- 
mon theme in research on the effects of 
welfare on family formation decisions. 
While our findings provide strong evi- 
dence that labor and marriage market con- 
ditions influence marriage rates, the ab- 
sence of a measure of within-industry-oc- 
cupation shifts in demand makes it difficult 
for us to evaluate their quantitative impact 
on time trends. However, to the extent that 
economic variables are important in ex- 
plaining the decline in marriage for young 
women, our results suggest that adverse 
trends in demand and supply conditions 
for young men and declining adult male 
real wages are the most likely factors con- 
tributing to this trend. 
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Is the decline in marriage a cause for 
concern? While it is possible that falling 
marriage rates among young women merely 
represent a delay in marriage, the inci- 
dence of children among this group hardly 
changed over the 1980s. This has meant 
that a greater share of children are grow- 
ing up in single parent families. Among 
the non-enrolled, the rise in single par- 
enthood has been particularly pro- 
nounced among the least educated. The 
major forces that have produced a dete- 
rioration in the labor market for less- 
skilled men-technological change and 
international trade-give no sign of abat- 
ing in strength. Our results imply that 
such forces will continue to inhibit mar- 
riage for white women with a high school 
degree or less education (who would tra- 
ditionally marry men in the affected 
groups) and perhaps for less educated 
black women as well. 
Table Al 
1980-1990 Changes in Weighted Means of Explanatory 
Variables for Women 16-24 Years Old, 111 MSA Regression Subsample 
White (non-Hispanic) Black (non-Hispanic) 
Description ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 ED < 12 ED = 12 ED > 12 
Female Net Supply (labor market) -0.038 0.027 0.021 0.143 0.157 0.053 
Female Net Supply (marriage market) -0.044 -0.138 0.055 -0.055 -0.190 -0.022 
Male Net Supply (labor market) 0.083 0.071 0.048 0.316 0.209 0.071 
Log Welfare Benefits -0.099 -0.100 -0.096 -0.096 -0.092 -0.093 
Log Average Male Wage (25-54 years) -0.035 -0.034 -0.026 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
Male Unemployment Rate (25-54 years) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Note: Means are weighted by the sum of the 1980 and 1990 population of women in the indicated age-race- 
education group. 
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